Canada’s spy agency believes Chinese-made cranes at many Canadian ports could be used for espionage or “cyber sabotage.”

A 2024 memo produced by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) found those cranes had features “that could be leveraged for cyber-espionage or cyber sabotage” and that there was a "realistic possibility" such cranes could be “compromised.”

That briefing note, which the IJF obtained through its Open By Default database, was produced by CSIS shortly after American lawmakers warned about mysterious cellular modems installed in ship-to-port cranes made by Chinese state-owned company Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited, or ZPMC.

U.S. officials warned those modems might be used by the Chinese government to monitor or disrupt activities at American ports. The report prompted alarm in Canada, where ZPMC cranes are used at many of the country’s largest container ports.

B.C. Premier David Eby told reporters that the federal government and local port authorities were investigating security risks posed by those cranes.

The CSIS briefing note, produced the month after Eby’s comments, said the spy agency found those cranes — used to move containers between ports and ships — deal with a wealth of information, including “sensitive data about containers and their contents, origins, and destinations and can be integrated into a port’s other IT systems.”

In some cases, the report said, port operators were “unaware of the inclusion of these capabilities.”

The CSIS report posited that state-sponsored threat actors could use that data to gain an advantage over competitors.

It also warned hacking groups might use the cranes as a backdoor to access a port’s other IT systems, thereby using them to hamstring the country’s supply chains.

CSIS spokesperson Magali Hébert said the agency “continues to regularly engage with industry partners to make them aware of the possible threats they face and to help build their resiliency against potential threats.”

“Hostile cyber actors target the critical infrastructure of Canada and our allies to facilitate espionage or sabotage activities. Certain sectors, like telecommunications and defense, offer significant intelligence value if successfully compromised. Others, such as energy, water, or transportation, could be exploited to cause disruptions and undermine the stability of the targeted country,” Hébert said.

Another briefing note, also obtained through Open By Default, warned that hacking groups, including Chinese ones, may also seek to target Canadian infrastructure as a way of gaining leverage over the United States.

In March 2024, the Communications Security Establishment produced a “top secret” briefing note warning that the Chinese hacking group Volt Typhoon might seek to attack Canada’s electricity grid, pipelines and transportation businesses as a way of crippling the flow of supplies and resources to the United States, one of China’s primary geopolitical adversaries.

CSIS found in April 2024 there was “no indication” that Volt Typhoon had targeted Canada, but said it was possible Chinese hacking groups “could attempt to access and possibly even disrupt Canadian [critical infrastructure] sectors to impede the same sectors in the U.S.”

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